Europe’s most recent great drama and its protagonists

Originally published in Greek by Kathimerini, 27 March 2022.

Until not long ago, Europe seemed to be an ensemble of democratic nations that, for the most part, had embraced liberal democracy. These nations displayed a determination to spread the spirit of Western liberal democracy to neighboring regions, including the Arab world, Islamist Turkey, and nationalist Russia. Recent and dramatic developments, however, have altered all that. The democratic experiment in the Arab world largely failed, Turkey regressed to an increasingly authoritarian form of government, and Russia proved to be a brutal dictatorship. At the same time, Britain’s withdrawal weakened the European Union, while the Trump era clearly showed that America cannot be relied upon as a permanent  European ally or be seen as a model for clear-cut liberal democracy. The West became disengaged.

Continue reading “Europe’s most recent great drama and its protagonists”

I, the People

When I was still a full-time academic, I wrote an article titled “Populists in Power,” which was published in the Journal of Democracy in April 2019. At around the same time, my book entitled Populism and Liberal Democracy: A Comparative and Theoretical Analysis also came out by Oxford UP. In both works, I painstakingly analyzed in comparative perspective the most important cases of populist parties/leaders that have enjoyed power in their respective countries. Those countries are, in order of chronological appearance of the populist forces, Argentina, Italy, Venezuela, Hungary, Greece, and the United States. Based on that academic analysis, and aided by a fantastic cartoonist, I decided to condense everything in a very short comic story, combining fictional and real characters. As you will notice (but also see References below), most of the dialogues are direct quotations from speeches or other public utterances by well-known populist leaders. If you enjoyed this blog, you may also want to browse through this slide show.

Continue reading “I, the People”

What happens when populism wins power?

Many people think that, when in power, populism is a “corrective” to democracy. This view is theoretically naive at best and empirically fictitious at worst. Just look at the most important real-life cases of ruling populism and you have a most clear answer to this blog’s title question: When populists win power, liberal democracies turn into illiberal ones; some even turn into real autocracies. Here below are six cartoons depicting, in chronological and historical order, the important cases of populist rule in Argentina, Italy, Venezuela, Hungary, Greece, and the United States under Donald Trump. All six cases have been analyzed and explained in separate chapters in my book Populism and Liberal Democracy: A Comparative and Theoretical Analysis (OUP, 2019). As of the cartoons below, these are part of a little comic story I wrote in collaboration with cartoonist Alecos Papadatos, which you can find—and probably enjoy—here and, as a slide show, here.

Continue reading “What happens when populism wins power?”

Ο νταής της Βουδαπέστης πάει σε εκλογές

Δημοσιεύτηκε στην Καθημερινή της Κυριακής, 30 Ιανουαρίου 2022.

Σκίτσο από το κόμικ “I, the People” των Takis Pappas & Alecos Papadatos

Το 2022 είναι φορτωμένο με ενδιαφέρουσες εκλογικές αναμετρήσεις σε πολλές χώρες του κόσμου, ανάμεσά τους τη Γαλλία (όπου κρίνεται η δεύτερη προεδρία Μακρόν), τη Βραζιλία (είναι σχεδόν βέβαιο ότι ο Ζαΐρ Μπολσονάρο θα χάσει την εξουσία), τις Φιλιππίνες (με κύριους πρωταγωνιστές τα παιδιά δύο αυταρχικών ηγετών, το γιό του πρώην δικτάτορα Μάρκος και την κόρη του σημερινού προέδρου Ντουτέρτε), καθώς και τις Ηνωμένες Πολιτείες (όπου στις λεγόμενες «ενδιάμεσες» εκλογές το Δημοκρατικό Κόμμα αναμένεται να υποστεί απώλειες). Καμία από αυτές τις εκλογικές αναμετρήσεις, ωστόσο, δεν θα είναι τόσο σημαντική όσο οι εθνικές εκλογές της Ουγγαρίας στις 3 Απριλίου. Και τούτο διότι κανένα από τα δύο πιθανά αποτελέσματα αυτών των εκλογών δεν πρόκειται να είναι θετικό, ούτε για τη δημοκρατία ούτε για την Ευρώπη.

Continue reading “Ο νταής της Βουδαπέστης πάει σε εκλογές”

Ο νταής της Βουδαπέστης πάει σε εκλογές

Δημοσιεύτηκε στην Καθημερινή της Κυριακής, 30 Ιανουαρίου 2022. Σε αγγλική μετάφραση εδώ.

Το 2022 είναι φορτωμένο με ενδιαφέρουσες εκλογικές αναμετρήσεις σε πολλές χώρες του κόσμου, ανάμεσά τους τη Γαλλία (όπου κρίνεται η δεύτερη προεδρία Μακρόν), τη Βραζιλία (είναι σχεδόν βέβαιο ότι ο Ζαΐρ Μπολσονάρο θα χάσει την εξουσία), τις Φιλιππίνες (με κύριους πρωταγωνιστές τα παιδιά δύο αυταρχικών ηγετών, το γιό του πρώην δικτάτορα Μάρκος και την κόρη του σημερινού προέδρου Ντουτέρτε), καθώς και τις Ηνωμένες Πολιτείες (όπου στις λεγόμενες «ενδιάμεσες» εκλογές το Δημοκρατικό Κόμμα αναμένεται να υποστεί απώλειες). Καμία από αυτές τις εκλογικές αναμετρήσεις, ωστόσο, δεν θα είναι τόσο σημαντική όσο οι εθνικές εκλογές της Ουγγαρίας στις 3 Απριλίου. Και τούτο διότι κανένα από τα δύο πιθανά αποτελέσματα αυτών των εκλογών δεν πρόκειται να είναι θετικό, ούτε για τη δημοκρατία ούτε για την Ευρώπη.

Continue reading “Ο νταής της Βουδαπέστης πάει σε εκλογές”

The bully of Budapest goes to the polls

Originally published as an op-ed in Greek newspaper Kathimerini, 30 January 2022.

2022 is packed with critical elections in many places around the globe, including France (to decide whether Emmanuel Macron will continue to be the resident of the Élysée), Brazil (Jair Bolsonaro is almost certain to suffer a rout), the Philippines (featuring the scions of two autocrats—the son of former dictator Ferdinand Marcos and the daughter of current president Rodrigo Duterte—as main protagonists), and the United States (where the Democrats are expected to suffer losses in the November midterm elections). None of those contests, however, is as important as Hungary’s national elections in early April. The reason for that is that none of the possible outcomes in that contest can be good for democracy or for Europe.

Continue reading “The bully of Budapest goes to the polls”

Europe was once a club of liberal democracies. Not any longer!

Following the expansion of EU over the last seventy years, this infographic depicts the evolution, and relative decline, of Europe’s post-war liberal democratic rule. Back in the 1950s, and for three decades thereafter, all member states had solid liberal democratic governments. The Union was in fact meant to be an exclusive club of liberal democracies. But things did not turn exactly that way. Already by the 1980s, populism, an amalgam of democracy and illiberalism (hence, minimally defined as democratic illiberalism), won power in Greece and then flourished elsewhere, particularly in the southern and eastern parts of the continent. During and after the 1990s, nativist parties—those standing in opposition to migration, further European integration, and globalization—grew strong in most developed countries in western and northern Europe. Meanwhile in Eastern Europe—because of national and ethnic divisions, persisting state corruption, or both—most countries have failed to this date to produce solid and durable liberal democratic governments; instead, as shown by the four CEE countries included herein, most governments in this region stand today as exemplars of democratic illiberalism.

Continue reading “Europe was once a club of liberal democracies. Not any longer!”

A Typology of Parties in Contemporary Europe, 1990-2020

This infographic presents an original typology of political parties in contemporary Europe during the last three decades. It differentiates between seven clearly defined types of parties that are exclusive to each other while collectively including all currently significant parties. The seven party types are: Liberal, populist, nativist, nationalist, regionalist, secessionist, and antidemocratic. The infographic is interactive. If downloaded, you may click on the party acronyms and visit their respective official web pages for more information. Enjoy your exploration to Europe’s ever-changing party and party system landscapes; get your concepts and definitions right; learn how to differentiate populist from non-populist parties (in a per genus et differentiam way); puzzle out how governments are formed; and get a hands-on understanding of your own about the dynamics currently developing, as well as the directions European liberal politics is likely to take in the future.


To download the full infographic, interact with it, and even print it in high-quality and professional form, click on the button below.

Continue reading “A Typology of Parties in Contemporary Europe, 1990-2020”

The case about Hungary

As of today, 31 March 2020, Hungary is no longer a democratic country. This raises at least four major questions in search for answers. Let’s give it a try based on previous research I have produced on this topic (you may follow the links provided).

What did happen in Hungary yesterday?

On Monday, 30 March 2020, the Hungarian parliament voted by a two-thirds supermajority to hand over its legislative powers to prime minister Viktor Orbán allowing him to rule by decree without a set time limit. The pretext was taking emergency measures to address the coronavirus crisis; but the real aim, and final result, was the death of democracy in an EU country. For, at bottom, Hungary’s parliamentary democracy is now officially dead. Continue reading “The case about Hungary”

Populism trivia: When did you first hear about populism defined as “democratic illiberalism” (even before Viktor Orbán made this definition popular)?

Well, definitely NOT in Fareed Zakaria’s “Rise of illiberal democracy.”

Populism first defined as "democratic illiberalism"

The first time that populism was conceptualized and defined simply as “democratic illiberalism” was in this paper, published online in FirstView in July 2013. Interestingly, the subject matter of the paper was a longitudinal comparative analysis of the two countries which, back in the early 2010s, already seemed like exemplars of populism, Greece of its leftist variant, Hungary of a rightist one. [For the record, one of the reviewers rejected the article because (a) the definition was “unconventional” and (b) the comparison of the two countries seemed rather outlandish.]

At the time, I presented the ideas in the paper in a few places and occasions. In one such place, there was an academic and (as I would learn later) close friend of Viktor Orbán who approached me after the presentation for the usual after-event little talk. He was a pleasant old fellow and, as I distinctly remember, he was impressed by my definition of populism. The paper was published in print in early 2014. In the summer of the same year, Orbán would make ripples world-wide with his famous speech about turning Hungary into an “illiberal democratic” state. 

Follow by Email
Twitter
Visit Us
Follow Me
LinkedIn
Share
Instagram