How to beat populism: Theory validation

This post is a follow-up to a previous one on the theory of how to beat populism. Here’s the empirical validation of the theoretical points made with reference to the case of Greece. Like the previous post, this one is an extract from my recent essay “The Pushback Against Populism: The Rise and Fall of Greece’s New Illiberalism,” published in the Journal of Democracy 31:2, April 2020. Another post will follow with the lessons other countries may draw from Greece’s rich experience with populism.

We posited in the previous post that unraveling modern populism would require a chain of developments inverting those that brought populists to power in the first place. Following this logic, the line of developments leading to populism’s downfall should begin with a liberal leader who acts within a populist-ruled political system, but in opposition to it. Events in Greece during the period from January 2016 through July 2019 offer perhaps the best illustration that we have of how such a leader’s rise might play out in practice.

Continue reading “How to beat populism: Theory validation”

Ποιό είναι το μέλλον της ηγεσίας Τσίπρα;

Δημοσιεύτηκε στην Καθημερινή της Κυριακής, 2 Φεβρουαρίου 2020. Μπορείτε να δείτε το περιεχόμενο του άρθρου και σε μορφή photoblog εδώ.

Στις δημοκρατίες, η πολιτική ηγεσία είναι συνάρτηση τεσσάρων κυρίως παραγόντων: της φυσιογνωμίας του ίδιου του ηγέτη, της γενικότερης ιστορικής συγκυρίας μέσα στην οποία δρα, του πολιτικού και θεσμικού πλαισίου της χώρας της οποίας ηγείται, και των προτιμήσεων των ψηφοφόρων. Σε όσες δημοκρατίες διαθέτουν στέρεο θεσμικό πλαίσιο και λειτουργούν σε σχετικά ομαλές ιστορικές συνθήκες, οι ηγέτες δρουν ως εντολοδόχοι που προσπαθούν να ανταποκριθούν στις ανάγκες των πολιτών με τον τρόπο που εκείνοι θεωρούν καλύτερο. Οι δε ψηφοφόροι, ως εντολείς, ψηφίζουν ως ηγέτη εκείνον που θεωρούν ότι προσφέρει το καλύτερο πρόγραμμα για την ικανοποίηση των αναγκών τους. Continue reading “Ποιό είναι το μέλλον της ηγεσίας Τσίπρα;”

The family album of the most important postwar populist rulers in Europe and the Americas

Who are the significant illiberal leaders who have ruled, and in several cases still rule, in the lands of populism? Here’s the complete postwar populist family album in Europe and the Americas. With the exception of the recent cases of Poland, Mexico and (arguably) Bolsonaro’s Brazil, all other populist leader cases are examined in depth and compared to each other in my book on Populism and Liberal Democracy. Enjoy the show!

ARGENTINA
Juan and Evita Perón
Néstor and Cristina Fernández de Kirchner

Continue reading “The family album of the most important postwar populist rulers in Europe and the Americas”

How to defeat populism – IV

This is the fourth and last in a mini-series of posts about how to beat populism at the polls. The first post emphasized the availability of a liberal leader, the second post stressed the need of establishing the leader’s authority over a party, and the third post was about the requirement of a credible and realistic policy agenda that would benefit the broader middle classes. This post suggests that the liberal leader utilizes a moderate discourse, aims at achieving political compromise, and defends institutional legality. As with the previous posts, the empirical case analyzed is contemporary Greece, and especially the more recent defeat of left populist SYRIZA by the liberal right-of-center party of New Democracy (ND) led by Kyriakos Mitsotakis. It bears repetition, Greece’s lessons are perfectly portable! So, if you’re interested in the forthcoming presidential elections in the US, please take note.

4/4 RHETORIC, CONSENSUS-BUILDING, INSTITUTIONAL LEGALITY

Throughout the opposition years, Mitsotakis was consistent in using a moderate political discourse which, on the one hand, emphasized the need to reinvigorate Greece’s damaged liberal institutions while, on the other hand, worked toward consensus-building and political compromise. To those ends, and in sharp contrast to the populists’ polarizing motto of “either Them or Us,” Mitsotakis offered a vision of national unity in which the government should not work for “the many [hoi polloi] but for all Greeks [holloi].” Above all, he sought to create an electoral majority consisting largely of entrepreneurial middle-class ordinary people to whom he proposed a sensible policy agenda centered on four issues of general concern: economic growth, public security, state functionality, and halting Greece’s human drain that continued unabated for over a decade.

Continue reading “How to defeat populism – IV”

Greece, September 2018

A month in a populist DEMOCRACY’s life

In early September 2018, something extraordinary happened in the European Parliament in Strasbourg: Two populist leaders, one on the right the other on the left, were invited to address the MEPs but for different reasons. In the afternoon plenary, Viktor Orbán stood accused for promoting democratic illiberalism in Hungary. Meanwhile, in the morning plenary, Alexis Tsipras of Greece had been given an opportunity to criticize the European Parliament itself for being “antidemocratic.” As I happened to be present in the Chamber, and witness both events, I was stricken by the different ways two leaders I considered fully populist were treated by the same legislative body. In a way of empirical experiment, I decided to keep a log of developments in Greek internal politics for the (random) month of September. Here is what I observed, and what I wrote at the time as an op-ed, which however was not published:-)

On 11 September 2018 the European Parliament in Strasbourg, France, went through a strange experience. In the morning plenary session, its members were asked to applaud a left populist leader for having completed an eight-year bailout program while his country remains in a shambles. In the afternoon plenary, the majority of deputies in the chamber became determined to discipline a right populist leader for the illiberal ways of ruling his own country. What explains such a different treatment by the European Parliament of two almost indistinguishably populist leaders? Presuming that they are neither bipolar nor biased in showing a preference for left over right populism, the simplest and only logical explanation is that the European lawmakers are misinformed.

The protagonist of the morning plenary was Greece’s prime minister Alexis Tsipras, who had been invited to talk in the chamber on the future of Europe. After being cordially introduced to the chamber by European Commission Vice President Valdis Dobrovskis, Tsipras thought it best to criticize the shortcomings of the European Union, which he accused of being antidemocratic, and warn the Parliament that next year’s European elections would be a fight for survival against populist movements of the right seeking to destroy the EU. He also decided, breaking with the tradition of keeping domestic politics out of international forums, to personally attack the leader of major opposition party, New Democracy, for nepotism and nationalist populism.

The afternoon plenary protagonist was Hungary’s premier Viktor Orbán. According to a meticulously detailed report prepared by Judith Sargentini, a Dutch legislator, Orbán’s government stood accused of such illiberal practices as undermining the functioning of Hungary’s constitutional system; the independence of its judiciary; the freedom of expression of press, academia and civic associations; as well as violating minority rights, mistreating migrants, asylum-seekers and refugees. With several of Orbán’s former allies in the European Parliament deserting him and vice president of the European Commission, Frans Timmermans, expressing his “serious concerns” about the situation in Hungary, the Parliament voted by ample majority to trigger article 7 of the Treaty on European Union that may ultimately lead to lifting Hungary’s voting rights in the EU institutions.

The sharply different treatment of two populist leaders is problematic, especially because some have come to the conclusion that Tsipras has now gone from being the Greek Corbyn to the EU’s poster boy. This is an erroneous belief. And if the European Parliament is so deeply concerned about the situation in Hungary it should be no less worried when a former Greek prime minister has already accused that Greece’s current populist government is undermining democracy. So, is Greece following Hungary’s path?

To find out, I kept a log of Greek politics during one single month, September 2018. Although the month selection is random, that was a time that the Greek government should feel both confident and optimistic. Confident because only a few days ago, on 20 August, Greece had ended its long saga under bailout from the Eurozone and the IMF, and optimistic because on 29 August, premier Tsipras reshuffled his cabinet to signify a fresh beginning for post-memorandum Greek politics. As previously, the new cabinet included representatives of the far-right party of Independent Greeks and, with 53 members, was certainly oversized. But what would mostly distinguish it was its ever-growing illiberalism.

Separation of powers, rule of law, and fear of technocracy

Begin with the new Minister of Justice, Michalis Kalogirou, a lawyer who in the past had made a name for representing anarchist groups using to mail parcel bombs to foreign diplomats. His assertion upon assuming his tasks that the judiciary and the executive “need both be on the same side in the fight against the enemies of the public interest,” prompted a critical article by the Financial Times entitled “Syriza choice for Justice minister sparks Greek rule of law fears.” Almost immediately, the minister refuted the FT piece, but also went further with a covert threat: “Following clarifications,” he declared, “any reference or reproduction of the [FT] article is institutional misconduct that aims at the creation of [false] perceptions, especially to the international audience and towards serving petty political purposes, and will be addressed with the proper way.”

Another episode of public intimidation by the state itself happened only a few days later. In the aftermath of the late July wildfires in Attica and a death toll that has now reached 99 people, the major opposition New Democracy party commissioned Costas Synolakis, a respected expert on natural hazards management at the Technical University of Crete, to produce a report about the fire inferno. The report said that the evacuation of the area destroyed by the fire could have been possible in less than 90 minutes, which the government had failed to do. In response, alternate Minister of Health Pavlos Polakis lashed out against the technocratic expert, but also did something more. He posted on Facebook the alleged address and a photo of the expert’s house, warning him about “electrocution” risks.

A new lοw for Greece’s rule of law was reached towards the close of September with the continuation of hounding Andreas Georgiou, the former chief of the Greek statistics agency for allegedly inflating the public deficit in order to justify Greece’s bailout program. Although Georgiou has already been cleared twice in the past by the Court of Appeals, the prosecutor decided to send the case to the same court for a third time.

Freedom of the press and state-run propaganda

By far the most serious assault against the freedom of press and rule of law happened in late September. The publisher, editor in chief and another journalist of the Greek newspaper Fileleftheros (The Liberal) were arrested and detained over a frontline article alleging mishandling of EU funds given to Greece for improving conditions in refugee hotspots in Greece. The arrest followed a lawsuit filed by Defense Minister Panos Kammenos, whose ministry is responsible for handling the EU funds. New Democracy party accused the minister of “thuggery” and, eventually, some key European leaders seemed to become sensitized for the growth of illiberalism in Greece. The European Anti-Fraud Agency (OLAF) also decided to look into the case after the discovery of “certain irregularities from the Ministry of Defense with a food contractor.”

State intimidation towards political opponents, technocratic experts, the press and the civil society did not only come personally from prominent cabinet members; they also came from the state-run media. One such case occurred in mid-September when, during a talk-show in public ERT TV channel, some journalist derided on air a recent speech by opposition leader Kyriakos Mitsotakis saying: “I thought I was listening to the Italian theorist of fascism, Sergio Panunzio, who introduced nationalistic elements to Italy’s Mussolini.” Immediately after the incident, New Democracy accused the government for “disgusting propaganda” and decided to withdraw all its MPs and party officials from all ERT programs, thus feeding political polarization even more.

Human right violations, public order, and academic safety

In a report published in early September by UK-based Refugee Rights Europe, two-thirds of residents at the Moria hot spot and other refugee camps on the island of Lesvos said they “never feel safe’ in the facilities provided to them by the Greek state. Another 22.4% said that they “don’t feel very safe.” Almost half (48.2%) said that they have witnessed another camp resident die, with 53.4% of that percentage saying that the fatality occurred as a result of violence and 40.5% believing that a death had resulted from untreated health problems. Almost half of respondents said they had experienced some form of police violence, mostly being exposed to tear gas. Physical violence was reported by 34.3% and verbal abuse by 35.6% of respondents. “There were also reports of sexual abuse, although it should be noted that it has not been possible to verify these accounts,” the report said.

Meanwhile in Athens public order in September was repeatedly disturbed without punishment by Rubicon, an anarchist group whose members have in the past year mounted dozens of attacks on foreign embassy buildings, diplomats’ homes, foreign-owned business premises and government offices. On 18 September the Greek police failed to avert a new attack by Rubicon to the embassy of Iran, one of the best-guarded in Athens. A video of the incident posted online showed men wearing crash helmets asking the armed guard to stay aside and then smashing his booth and defacing the embassy building with paint. In yet another incident later in the same month, members of Rubicon entered a church in central Athens shouting slogans and interrupting the mass.

In September also was made public another report with recommendations for safer university campuses prepared by a committee led by former SYRIZA justice minister Nikos Paraskevopoulos. To curb chronic lawlessness (ranging from thefts and drug dealing to the occupation of faculty buildings and destruction of university property), the report proposed such solutions as the removal of all cash machines from university campuses, the organization of voluntary support groups for drug addicts, the creation of “supervised leisure areas” for students lest they avoid occupying buildings, and the establishment of committees to discuss and negotiate with members of sit-ins during which vandalism usually occurs! The youth organization of the major opposition party rejected the report as “unacceptable, ridiculous and offensive.”

Greece like Hungary?

It is understandable that the European Commission and the European Parliament, burdened with other serious problems, not least of them the situation in Orbán’s Hungary, want to put a positive spin to the Greek story. But, for close observers of Greek politics and the Greek people alike, the reality is quite different. It is also a reality that reflects clearly in two other reports that, incidentally, became public in September. The first is the latest Human Freedom Index showing that since 2008 the largest slump in freedom has occurred in Syria, Egypt, Venezuela, Belize and Greece; the second is the 2018 annual report on economic freedom in the world by the Frazer Institute in which Greece ranks 108th among 162 countries surveyed, sharing the same position as China and Swaziland. As freedom deteriorates in Greece and the Greek economy for all practical purposes remains depressed and committed to maintaining a high budget surplus, Greece’s politics will continue sliding towards illiberalism in a way reminiscent of Hungary’s populist democracy.

The causes of populism

A detailed analysis of how the model of populist causality works is in my Populism and Liberal Democracy: A Comparative and Theoretical Analysis (Oxford University Press 2019), pp. 123-130

A TIP-OFF: The present model does not apply to nativist parties, which are often, unfortunately, and erroneously (mis)classified as “populist.” It only applies to populist parties that have emerged strong, and ruled, in the “lands of populism.”        

The image featured above represents the causal model of populism qua democratic illiberalism. It is the outcome of an intricate interplay of structural conditions, quasi-rational extraordinary leaders, and political mechanisms. No factor is independent from the rest, and each factor must be examined in sequential causal logic.

Continue reading “The causes of populism”

The nation that failed big, and survived

Originally published in eKathimerini, 30 July 2019

Nations fail for a variety of reasons. These include geographical hindrances, harmful cultural inclinations, downward economic spirals, exclusionary institutions, or, indeed, the lack of institutions. Some especially unlucky nations fail for all those reasons at once. Take Greece over the past decade. Continue reading “The nation that failed big, and survived”

Γιατί έχασε τις εκλογές ο ΣΥΡΙΖΑ;

Δημοσιεύτηκε στην Καθημερινή της Κυριακής, 11 Αυγούστου 2019

Κατά κανόνα, οι λαϊκιστές κερδίζουν δύσκολα την εξουσία αλλά εξίσου δύσκολα την χάνουν. Συνήθως διατηρούνται σε αυτήν για δεύτερη ή και περισσότερες κυβερνητικές θητείες, όπως ήδη συμβαίνει στην Ουγγαρία (το κόμμα του Ορμπάν έχει κερδίσει τρεις συνεχόμενες εκλογές) ή όπως συνέβη στο παρελθόν στην Ιταλία, καθώς και στην χώρα μας από την δεκαετία του ΄80 και μετά. Οι προσεχείς εκλογές του Οκτωβρίου στην Πολωνία μάλλον πρόκειται να επιβεβαιώσουν τον κανόνα, αφού οι δημοσκοπήσεις προβλέπουν νίκη των λαϊκιστών για δεύτερη συνεχόμενη φορά. Η πρόσφατη λοιπόν ήττα του ΣΥΡΙΖΑ στις εκλογές του Ιουλίου μετά από μία μόνο πλήρη κυβερνητική θητεία αποτελεί εξαίρεση του παραπάνω κανόνα. Πώς εξηγείται; Continue reading “Γιατί έχασε τις εκλογές ο ΣΥΡΙΖΑ;”

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