This post is an extract from my essay “The Pushback Against Populism: The Rise and Fall of Greece’s New Illiberalism,” freshly published in the Journal of Democracy 31:2, April 2020. Two more post follow shortly. One of them, will test the theory presented herein against real historical evidence drawn from the case of contemporary Greece. A third post will be about the lessons offered by Greece’s more recent experience with populism. Those lessons are valuable for other countries, some of which are already faced with forthcoming elections.
Given that populist parties generally establish a tight grip on the state and make effective use of patronage tactics, no such party is likely to be voted out of office so long as it governs with a modicum of efficiency and so long as the leader’s charisma retains its luster. Even during economic downturns, populist governments can still provide selective patronage to their supporters at the expense of the opposition. Ever-increasing polarization further cements the populists’ hold on their electorate. With all these advantages shoring up their grip, how can ruling populists be toppled?
A defeat of populism requires reversing the wave that brought populists to power in the first place. Following the same logic as before, but now in inverse, we have to explain how liberals can make a political comeback and reclaim office through competitive elections. Logically, then, everything hinges on the presence of an opposition leader with certain qualifications who is ready to spearhead the drive back to political liberalism. Such a leader must be able, first, to build up the strength of the liberal party so that it can compete more effectively at the polls; second, to present a well-crafted political and policy agenda; third, to develop and stick to a discourse that emphasizes consensus, compromise, and respect for legal and institutional norms; and, fourth, to put forward a tenable idea of a working liberal-democratic polity that resonates with the rational rather than the emotional side of voters’ thinking.To successfully challenge populism, the liberal leader needs to exercise significant personal authority over her or his party when it comes to choosing a political strategy, setting the policy agenda, and deciding questions of internal organization. Strong leadership is necessary to minimize the divisive effects of internal dissent, but also to make the party bearing the liberal standard more appealing to hitherto reluctant supporters—and even to the backers of smaller opposition parties, who may switch their support to the main liberal party if they can be convinced that it represents their best means of combatting populism. The stronger the major challenger party becomes, the greater its chances of uniting the fragmented opposition and unseating the populist incumbent.
Whereas ruling populists lack a clear and detailed political program, the liberal challenger must set forth a program that is both realistic and credible. In order to assemble an electoral majority, the liberal leader must speak to as wide a stratum of society as possible; in modern societies, this means that it is particularly important to reach the expansive middle classes. He or she should put forward a policy agenda highlighting issues of immediate practical concern to these voters, such as economic growth, lower taxes, social security, good administration, and opportunities for political participation. But whereas populists show a disregard for institutional legality, the liberal leader should pledge to serve middle-class interests only within the confines of the rule of law and within the framework of liberal political institutions.
Populist discourse is adversarial and polarizing, framing politics as a zero-sum game in which the people face off against a minority of elites. By contrast, the liberal party’s rhetoric and its political course should be characterized by political moderation, consensus-seeking, and the idea of politics as a positive-sum game in which every individual and each minority within society can benefit while advancing the “common good” as law-abiding citizens.
Finally, it is imperative that the liberal leader put forward a powerful but realistic idea for reconstituting liberal democracy and ensuring that institutions are strong enough to avert crises of democratic representation. To do this, liberals must appeal to the rational elements of voters’ thinking (in particular, the ideas of self-interest, compromise, and pragmatism) and steer voters away from more emotive influences (in particular, the sense of victimhood, enmity, and quest for redemption).
