Πώς μπορεί να ηττηθεί ο Ντόναλντ Τραμπ

συντομη απαντηση: ακριβως οπως ηττηθηκε ο λαΪκισμοσ στην ελλαδα

Δημοσιεύθηκε στην Καθημερινή της Κυριακής, 26 Απριλίου 2020. Το κείμενο βασίστηκε σε αυτό το πρόσφατο άρθρο: “The pushback against populism: The rise and fall of Greece’s new illiberalism”.

Απομένουν περίπου 200 ημέρες μέχρι τις αμερικανικές εκλογές της 3ης Νοεμβρίου και η πλεύση προς αυτές θα γίνει σε αχαρτογράφητα θολά νερά. Ανάμεσα στους αστάθμητους παράγοντες που πρόκειται να καθορίσουν το τελικό αποτέλεσμα θα είναι, ασφαλώς, η εξέλιξη της πανδημίας του κορωνοϊού στην Αμερική και οι επιπτώσεις της στην οικονομία της χώρας. Το δυσκολότερο όμως ερώτημα αυτών των εκλογών είναι άλλο: Με ποιόν τρόπο μπορεί να ηττηθεί ο λαϊκιστής Πρόεδρος της Αμερικής; Continue reading “Πώς μπορεί να ηττηθεί ο Ντόναλντ Τραμπ”

Donald Trump, authentic populist

Today, Early 2020, President Trump is as populist as he was as a presidential candidate in early 2016. And the concept of “populism” is today as badly understood as it was back then. And this older piece NOW seems to me as accurate about u.s. politics as i believed it to be 4 years ago. anD it’s worrisome!

This is an older article that I think it deserves some attention so I’m reposting it here. It was originally written in early 2016 between Super Tuesdays, when Trump was still one of the candidates for the Republican nomination, and became published in openDemocracy under a similar title as above. That was also about the time that everyone began using the term “populism” to explain pretty much everything that happened later in the course of that year (the British referendum, the coup in Turkey, the November presidential elections in the US), let alone much of what would happen ever since. In my piece, I used a concise conceptualization of populism according to which Trump classifies as an authentic populist. Based on that analysis, I concluded the 2016 piece with this prediction: “If Trump wins the next Republican presidential nomination, he is surely going to reshape the face of American politics and society from the most fundamentally liberal in the world to one that will be outright populist.” That was my forecasting from a political scientist’s perspective back in March 2016. The rest is history.

He seems to have come out of nowhere; he is immoderate and choleric, uses a rhetoric full of rage and a message that is mystifying, almost unfathomable; his policy positions do not square with those of the party he claims to represent; and, at the moment, he dominates public discourse and the political process. He is of course, Donald Trump, but what type of politician is he? And why the answer to this question matters? Continue reading “Donald Trump, authentic populist”

“Πρόβα ορχήστρας” του νέου ελληνικού πολιτικού συστήματος εν μέσω πανδημίας; Όπερ έδει δείξαι …

Μία πρώϊμη εκδοχή αυτού του ποστ (χωρίς τα λινκς) δημοσιεύτηκε στο Protagon, 15 Απριλίου 2020, με τίτλο “Οικοδομώντας την φιλελεύθερη δημοκρατία εν μέσω πανδημίας”

Αν, αυτές τις μέρες της προσωρινής μας απομόνωσης, παρατηρήσουμε προσεκτικά το νέο πολιτικό τοπίο που διαμορφώνεται εν μέσω αλλεπάλληλων κρίσεων, ειδικά δε της εξελισσόμενης πανδημίας covid-19, θα διαπιστώσουμε ότι όλα τα βασικά στοιχεία μιας σύγχρονης φιλελεύθερης δημοκρατίας είναι για πρώτη φορά παρόντα και συνεργάζονται μεταξύ τους.

 

Μέσα Απριλίου 2020. Έχει ήδη περάσει παραπάνω από μήνας που έκλεισαν τα σχολεία της χώρας και, κατόπιν, τα μαγαζιά, οι παραλίες, τα πάρκα, οι εκκλησίες – σχεδόν τα πάντα. Απομονωμένοι στα σπίτια μας, εκείνα που τώρα μας απασχολούν είναι η διαχείριση του ανεξέλεγκτου προσωπικού φόβου μας και η αγωνία για το τι μέλλει να συμβεί, στον κόσμο αλλά και κυρίως στη χώρα μας. Ετούτην ακριβώς τη στιγμή υπάρχουν μόνο τρία αδιαμφισβήτητα δεδομένα, τα εξής: Continue reading ““Πρόβα ορχήστρας” του νέου ελληνικού πολιτικού συστήματος εν μέσω πανδημίας; Όπερ έδει δείξαι …”

How to beat populism: Valuable lessons from Greece (especially for America)

This is the third in a mini series of posts on how to beat populism. The first post offered a concise theory while the second one validated the theory using Greece’s case of defeating populists as an exemplary case. This third posts is precisely about the lessons Greece may offer to other countries, including the United States, where populism is still in power. All three posts are extracts from my recent essay “The Pushback Against Populism: The Rise and Fall of Greece’s New Illiberalism,” published in the Journal of Democracy 31:2, April 2020.

For other countries where democrats are wrestling with the problem of populism, Greece’s contemporary experience offers four major valuable lessons:

First, modern parliamentary democracies are Janus-faced: One face looks toward a liberal democratic system, the other toward a populist one. In the liberal conception of democracy, societies are divided by multiple cleavages, which must be bridged by respect for the rule of law, institutional norms, deliberative practices, and minority rights. In the populist conception, societies are split along a single line that separates the vast majority of people from a small elite, with these two groups entangled in perpetual conflict. This leads naturally to the conclusion that what matters is satisfying the interests of the majority—even if this should happen to be achieved by illiberal or unconstitutional means. Continue reading “How to beat populism: Valuable lessons from Greece (especially for America)”

How to beat populism: Theory validation

This post is a follow-up to a previous one on the theory of how to beat populism. Here’s the empirical validation of the theoretical points made with reference to the case of Greece. Like the previous post, this one is an extract from my recent essay “The Pushback Against Populism: The Rise and Fall of Greece’s New Illiberalism,” published in the Journal of Democracy 31:2, April 2020. Another post will follow with the lessons other countries may draw from Greece’s rich experience with populism.

We posited in the previous post that unraveling modern populism would require a chain of developments inverting those that brought populists to power in the first place. Following this logic, the line of developments leading to populism’s downfall should begin with a liberal leader who acts within a populist-ruled political system, but in opposition to it. Events in Greece during the period from January 2016 through July 2019 offer perhaps the best illustration that we have of how such a leader’s rise might play out in practice.

Continue reading “How to beat populism: Theory validation”

How to beat populism: The theory

This post is an extract from my essay “The Pushback Against Populism: The Rise and Fall of Greece’s New Illiberalism,” freshly published in the Journal of Democracy 31:2, April 2020. Two more post follow shortly. One of them, will test the theory presented herein against real historical evidence drawn from the case of contemporary Greece. A third post will be about the lessons offered by Greece’s more recent experience with populism. Those lessons are valuable for other countries, some of which are already faced with forthcoming elections.

Given that populist parties generally establish a tight grip on the state and make effective use of patronage tactics, no such party is likely to be voted out of office so long as it governs with a modicum of efficiency and so long as the leader’s charisma retains  its luster. Even during economic downturns, populist governments can still provide selective patronage to their supporters at the expense of the opposition. Ever-increasing polarization further cements the populists’ hold on their electorate. With all these advantages shoring up their grip, how can ruling populists be toppled?

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Greece 2010-2020: From one big crisis to another, from utter failure to unexpected success

When in crisis, countries may undergo dramatic changes. Look at today’s Greece!

In 2014, while Greece was entangled in her previous major crisis since 2010, I wrote a book that was published under the title Populism and Crisis Politics in Greece (also translated into Greek). Throughout the ultimate pages, the obvious question was naturally posed:

How can Greece exit from its present quandary, reinvigorate the state, and re-enter a virtuous cycle of political activity and economic growth? (p. 134)

My reply at the time consisted of four possible solutions: (1) “the ‘big bang’ solution; (2) the emergence of a new reformist political class; (3) charismatic leadership; and (4) sticking to Europe as a geographical and political determinant [of national politics].”

Continue reading “Greece 2010-2020: From one big crisis to another, from utter failure to unexpected success”

The politics of pandemic prevention in Spain and Greece

All countries will suffer. But countries with inefficient governments will suffer more than others

This blog post has featured in Libertad Digital (Spain), LIFO (Greece), European Pravda (Ukraine), Bloomberg Views (USA), The TOC (Greece), Nius Diario (Spain), iefimerida (Greece), Ta Nea (Greece), The Globe and Mail (Canada), South EU Summit (Italy), Information (Denmark), Capital (Bulgaria)

When the covid-19 pandemic broke out in Europe, no government had any experience of how to face it and each tried to weather the storm in its own ways. Some governments fared better, some less so. By and large, there are three major factors that have determined, and still do, how governments cope with the virus. These are, first, the resoluteness and efficiency of their leadership; second, the capacity of states and public health systems in particular to deal with such an extraordinary health crisis situation; and, third, the cooperation of national publics in following emergency rules. At a more specific level, as shown by an even cursory comparison of the Spanish and Greek experiences with the pandemic, it seems that a well-integrated and liberal government performs significantly better than one which is disunited and, moreover, diluted with populists. Let’s have a closer look at the two cases.

At the time of this writing (5 April 2020), Spain has close to 130,000 confirmed cases of coronavirus victims and about 12,000 deaths. At the same time, Greece has about 1,700 confirmed cases and 68 deaths. So, the question is: Why these two Mediterranean countries, whose people are equally sun-loving, bar-hopping, and intensely social, and which should have drawn the same lessons from Italy’s preceding experience, have had such different fates during the early phase of the coronavirus crisis? The answer is simple, almost mundane: Different governments!

Continue reading “The politics of pandemic prevention in Spain and Greece”

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