This is the third in a mini series of posts on how to beat populism. The first post offered a concise theory while the second one validated the theory using Greece’s case of defeating populists as an exemplary case. This third posts is precisely about the lessons Greece may offer to other countries, including the United States, where populism is still in power. All three posts are extracts from my recent essay “The Pushback Against Populism: The Rise and Fall of Greece’s New Illiberalism,” published in the Journal of Democracy 31:2, April 2020.
For other countries where democrats are wrestling with the problem of populism, Greece’s contemporary experience offers four major valuable lessons:
First, modern parliamentary democracies are Janus-faced: One face looks toward a liberal democratic system, the other toward a populist one. In the liberal conception of democracy, societies are divided by multiple cleavages, which must be bridged by respect for the rule of law, institutional norms, deliberative practices, and minority rights. In the populist conception, societies are split along a single line that separates the vast majority of people from a small elite, with these two groups entangled in perpetual conflict. This leads naturally to the conclusion that what matters is satisfying the interests of the majority—even if this should happen to be achieved by illiberal or unconstitutional means.
Second, when in office, populist parties respect electoral rules but disregard the institutional and procedural norms that are key to liberal democracy. (If populist parties cease to respect basic electoral freedoms, as for instance in Venezuela, they have crossed the line from populism-qua–democratic illiberalism to authoritarianism.) In all cases, these parties follow a template that entails colonizing the state with cronies, heightening polarization, enfeebling liberal institutions, and making systematic use of patronage—all under the direction of a charismatic leader. It is not surprising, then, that once in power, populists usually manage to divide the opposition and keep themselves in office for long periods of time.
Third, populism can nonetheless be defeated if a liberal leader emerges who is capable of reversing the causal chain of developments that brought populists to power in the first place. As the Greek case shows, such a leader needs to appeal to the liberal opposition with moderate rhetoric and a realistic policy agenda that can be implemented within the framework of democratic institutions. This is the only way to forge an electoral majority of middle-class centrist voters yearning for political normalcy.
Finally, there is a fourth lesson that should never be forgotten: Populism will always remain a potential danger for liberal democracies so long as they continue to face in two directions, undecided as to whether it is majoritarianism or constitutionalism that holds the final sway in politics.
