A longish read about (1) the differences between right populism and left populism and (2) the disturbing realization that left populism is in most respects similar to its right-wing populist cousin.
Here’s a little quiz: Pick a right populist party and a left populist party of your choice and try to compare them in your mind. Now ask yourself: Are those parties most different because of their right-left distinction or are they most similar because of their populism? For, if they are most different, their “populism” becomes virtually irrelevant and we should center on the time-honored ideological differences between right and left parties. We should also expect such ideologically opposite parties to be politically incompatible. But if the parties you have chosen are deemed to have more similarities than differences, we should disregard ideology and focus instead on what is “populist” about them. We may then discover that their populism is the one element that glues them together. Since the issue here is more than a mere logical quandary, it is worth pursuing it further.
A good beginning is to ask: What is left populism? In a recent book on this subject, Belgian political scientist Chantal Mouffe argues that left populism is very simply a strategy which, based on a specific vocabulary, would allow the left to build movements against economic and political inequality. Ours is a time of “post-democracy,” she writes, in which the democratic ideals of equality and popular sovereignty get fast eroded. The increase of inequalities, Mouffe goes on to explain, is the outcome of economic neoliberalism and the increased “oligarchization” of liberal democratic politics. Consequently, as politics turns into a “domain reserved for experts,” popular sovereignty becomes obsolete. With such a picture in mind, Mouffe advocates a left populism that would “recover democracy … deepen and extend it” (p24). To achieve those ends, then, left populist parties “should try to provide a different vocabulary in order to orientate [the popular demands] towards more egalitarian objectives” (p22).
And what is right populism? For the lack of a more established theorist for the populist right, let us turn our attention to maverick ideologue Steve Bannon. Formerly the White House chief strategist in the early phase of Donald Trump’s administration, he subsequently became a political operator in Brussels seeking to give a common voice and unite right populist parties across Europe. In a way similar to Chantal Mouffe’s, Bannon sees right populism as a master plan for attacking selfish, libertarian capitalism to the benefit of a politically sovereign hard-working people. He even uses the precepts of Marx to attack unprincipled neoliberalism “that really looks to make people commodities, and to objectify people and to use them.” The central think that binds right populist parties together, Bannon says, is that they all represent “the middle class, the working men and women in the world who are just tired of being dictated to by … the party of Davos.” Right populism, therefore, is a global reaction to centralized governments, whether those in Washington or in Brussels: So, Bannon concludes, “we are the platform for the voice of that [reaction].”
From what emerges so far, right populism and left populism are kin when it comes to their political opponents (both fight against the neoliberal establishment) and political aims (both seek to restore social equality and popular sovereignty for the majority of the people in society). This is to say that, politically as well as electorally, right and left populist parties compete for the exactly the same voters.
According to Chantal Mouffe, the earliest political reaction to Europe’s political establishment came from the right, especially the FPÖ in Austria and the National Front in France. She further explains: By presenting themselves “as aiming to give back to ‘the people’ the voice of which they had been deprived by the elites, … [those parties] were able to translate into nationalistic vocabulary the demands of the popular sectors who felt excluded from the dominant consensus” (pp18-19). Left populist awakening, Mouffe writes, only happened with the anti-globalization movements of the early 2010s, when austerity politics affected the lives of people in several European countries. Even so, the themes of right and left populism are the same. In Steve Bannon’s own words,
“the theme is middle-class and working-class people — they’re saying, “Hey, I’m working harder than I’ve ever worked. I’m getting less benefits than I’m ever getting through this, I’m incurring less wealth myself, and I’m seeing a system of fat cats who say they’re conservative and say they back capitalist principles, but all they’re doing is binding with corporatists.”
Mouffe is fully aware of the similarity between left and right populism since, in her words, both types of populism “aim to federate unsatisfied demands,” but, she adds, “they do it in very different ways” (p23). Right populism, she explains, “claims that it will bring back popular sovereignty and restore democracy, but this sovereignty is understood as ‘national sovereignty’ and reserved for those deemed to be true ‘nationalists” (pp23-24). In contrast, left populism “wants to recover democracy to deepen and extend it” by creating a broad social alliance of “workers, the immigrants and the precarious middle class … that will permit the radicalization of democracy” (p24).
What does all this mean when we move from lofty political theory to the real political ground?
A good example of left populism is La France Insoumise (translated in English as Unsubmissive France), a political party led by Jean-Luc Mélenchon, who is also a frequent interlocutor of Ms. Mouffe. How does he and his party plan to “recover” democracy? In political terms, first, Mélenchon stands for a strong French nation (which also includes supporting Wallonia’s aspiration to secede from the Belgian state and become part of France) and opposes both the EU and NATO, both perceived as affronts to France’s national sovereignty. Second, in economic terms, he lashes against economic globalization and austerity politics, calling instead for a state-regulated economy and an emphasis on wealth redistribution to rectify economic inequalities. Finally, in cultural terms, Mélenchon is a strong defender of France’s ethnic and national distinction while also supporting same-sex marriage, women’s right to abortion, and the legalization of cannabis.
What is “leftist” and what is “populist” in Mélenchon’s party? For orthodox communists, there is nothing truly left to it. For instance, French sociologist Eric Fassin has suggested that Mélenchon’s politics is pure populism as it is above all an expression of “resentiment,” and therefore associated with the Right rather than the left’s struggles. “There are two sorts of cholesterol, good and bad,” Fassin quips, “but for the left, there is no such thing as good populism.”
Turning to right populism on the ground, let us now shift attention to the French Rassemblement National (National Rally, formerly known as National Front), led by Marine Le Pen. As with all right populist and nativist forces, this party’s most distinguishing characteristic is its all-embracing nationalism that consists of national sovereignty, economic nationalism, and cultural distinction grounded on Christian doctrine and disdain for Islam.
The call for national sovereignty, firstly, is a call against globalization and for restoring a strong and expansive French nation (that would also include Wallonia). Le Pen calls for the introduction of border controls, opposes the EU, has pledged to take France out of NATO, wants the abolition of the IMF, but keeps amiable relations with Russia. Economic nationalism, secondly, favors the intervention of state in the economy based on policies seeking to strengthen domestic controls over the labor and capital formation while at the same time imposing tariffs and other restrictions on the free movement of people, goods and ideas. Le Pen, rallies against globalization, which she sees as a barbarity, wants the dismantling of the Eurozone, and favors a protectionist state especially in the crucial areas of health, transportation, banking and energy. As of cultural distinction, thirdly, Le Pen stands against immigration and multiculturalism. She thus sets right populism against the secularization of the western values while preaching national homogeneity and distinction. As of specific social issues, Le Pen has pledged to abolish same-sex marriage but supports abortion remaining legal.
We have reached a moment of truth. For, when we compare left and right populisms as expressed by their emblematic intellectual leaders, as well as the empirical comparison of quintessentially left and right populist parties, we discover a disturbing reality: they look almost symmetrical. Both party groups pursue exactly the same goals with respect to national sovereignty, state-led economic patriotism, and cultural distinction. They both forcefully militate against supranational and international institutions, free trade and liberalized markets, multiculturalism and minority rights – all key traits of modern democratic liberalism. And where do they differ at? Ah, left populism displays a so-to-speak “postmodern” face when it comes to some social issues (such as gay marriage) while right populism is mostly premodern, that is, socially conservative (but remember that Le Pen supports abortion rights). Not a big deal, really.
The differences between right populism and left populism, therefore, do not lie in their overall views about the political system, whether domestically or internationally; in the divergent economic systems they espouse, since both are economic nationalists; or in cultural distinction. It lies in their views – or, rather, their antithesis – on specific, mostly liberal, social issues. So, if right-wing populism stands in principle against same-sex marriage and women’s right to abortion, left-wing populism is common to display anti-Semitism (usually born out of sympathy for Palestinians), skepticism for vaccines (but also for stem cell research or testing on animals), and an inherent antipathy for individual excellence (as opposed to social parity).
REFERENCES
- Steven Bannon, Transcript of his remarks during a 2014 conference held by the Human Dignity Institute in the Vatican, Rome.
- Chantal Mouffe, For a Left Populism (London: Verso, 2019)
