The politics of pandemic prevention in Spain and Greece

All countries will suffer. But countries with inefficient governments will suffer more than others

This blog post has featured in Libertad Digital (Spain), LIFO (Greece), European Pravda (Ukraine), Bloomberg Views (USA), The TOC (Greece), Nius Diario (Spain), iefimerida (Greece), Ta Nea (Greece), The Globe and Mail (Canada), South EU Summit (Italy), Information (Denmark), Capital (Bulgaria)

When the covid-19 pandemic broke out in Europe, no government had any experience of how to face it and each tried to weather the storm in its own ways. Some governments fared better, some less so. By and large, there are three major factors that have determined, and still do, how governments cope with the virus. These are, first, the resoluteness and efficiency of their leadership; second, the capacity of states and public health systems in particular to deal with such an extraordinary health crisis situation; and, third, the cooperation of national publics in following emergency rules. At a more specific level, as shown by an even cursory comparison of the Spanish and Greek experiences with the pandemic, it seems that a well-integrated and liberal government performs significantly better than one which is disunited and, moreover, diluted with populists. Let’s have a closer look at the two cases.

At the time of this writing (5 April 2020), Spain has close to 130,000 confirmed cases of coronavirus victims and about 12,000 deaths. At the same time, Greece has about 1,700 confirmed cases and 68 deaths. So, the question is: Why these two Mediterranean countries, whose people are equally sun-loving, bar-hopping, and intensely social, and which should have drawn the same lessons from Italy’s preceding experience, have had such different fates during the early phase of the coronavirus crisis? The answer is simple, almost mundane: Different governments!

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Greece’s major firsts in European and world politics since 1821.

For a Greek version of these (and more) firsts of modern Greece, see here.

1. Greece was the first of the lands of the Ottoman Empire in Europe to not only revolt against the Porte (this first goes to the Serbs) but also, in 1830, to win her independence as a national state (Serbia became an independent kingdom as late as 1878).

2. In 1844, Greece became the first European nation and second worldwide (only to the Kingdom of Hawaii) to grand electoral suffrage to all male Greek citizens with no income or other restrictions. For comparison, France and Switzerland introduced universal male suffrage in 1848, Germany in 1871, Austria in 1896, Spain in 1890, Italy in 1912, and the UK in 1918.

Continue reading “Greece’s major firsts in European and world politics since 1821.”

Πόσες ιστορικές πρωτιές χωράνε σε 200 χρόνια εθνικής ιστορίας;

Δημοσιεύτηκε στην Καθημερινή της Κυριακής, 23 Φεβρουαρίου 2020, με τίτλο “Ιστορικές πρωτιές σε 200 χρόνια εθνικής ιστορίας”: https://www.kathimerini.gr/1066055/opinion/epikairothta/politikh/istorikes-prwties-se-200-xronia-e8nikhs-istorias

Η επερχόμενη επέτειος για την συμπλήρωση δύο αιώνων από την Επανάσταση του ΄21 αποτελεί θαυμάσια ευκαιρία για την απογραφή των ιστορικών περιστάσεων στις οποίες  η χώρα πρωτοπόρησε σε σχέση με τα υπόλοιπα ευρωπαϊκά έθνη ή και διεθνώς. Όσο κι αν φαίνεται παράδοξο για μια μικρή και όχι πλούσια χώρα σαν την δική μας, η Ελλάδα βρέθηκε συχνά στην πρωτοπορία ιστορικών εξελίξεων παγκόσμιας σημασίας – αν και όχι πάντα με θετικό για την ίδια αποτέλεσμα. Ας δούμε αμέσως, κατά χρονολογική σειρά, μια δεκάδα από τις πιο εντυπωσιακές πρωτιές της χώρας μας κατά τους δύο προηγούμενους αιώνες. Continue reading “Πόσες ιστορικές πρωτιές χωράνε σε 200 χρόνια εθνικής ιστορίας;”

Ποιό είναι το μέλλον της ηγεσίας Τσίπρα;

Δημοσιεύτηκε στην Καθημερινή της Κυριακής, 2 Φεβρουαρίου 2020. Μπορείτε να δείτε το περιεχόμενο του άρθρου και σε μορφή photoblog εδώ.

Στις δημοκρατίες, η πολιτική ηγεσία είναι συνάρτηση τεσσάρων κυρίως παραγόντων: της φυσιογνωμίας του ίδιου του ηγέτη, της γενικότερης ιστορικής συγκυρίας μέσα στην οποία δρα, του πολιτικού και θεσμικού πλαισίου της χώρας της οποίας ηγείται, και των προτιμήσεων των ψηφοφόρων. Σε όσες δημοκρατίες διαθέτουν στέρεο θεσμικό πλαίσιο και λειτουργούν σε σχετικά ομαλές ιστορικές συνθήκες, οι ηγέτες δρουν ως εντολοδόχοι που προσπαθούν να ανταποκριθούν στις ανάγκες των πολιτών με τον τρόπο που εκείνοι θεωρούν καλύτερο. Οι δε ψηφοφόροι, ως εντολείς, ψηφίζουν ως ηγέτη εκείνον που θεωρούν ότι προσφέρει το καλύτερο πρόγραμμα για την ικανοποίηση των αναγκών τους. Continue reading “Ποιό είναι το μέλλον της ηγεσίας Τσίπρα;”

How to defeat populism – IV

This is the fourth and last in a mini-series of posts about how to beat populism at the polls. The first post emphasized the availability of a liberal leader, the second post stressed the need of establishing the leader’s authority over a party, and the third post was about the requirement of a credible and realistic policy agenda that would benefit the broader middle classes. This post suggests that the liberal leader utilizes a moderate discourse, aims at achieving political compromise, and defends institutional legality. As with the previous posts, the empirical case analyzed is contemporary Greece, and especially the more recent defeat of left populist SYRIZA by the liberal right-of-center party of New Democracy (ND) led by Kyriakos Mitsotakis. It bears repetition, Greece’s lessons are perfectly portable! So, if you’re interested in the forthcoming presidential elections in the US, please take note.

4/4 RHETORIC, CONSENSUS-BUILDING, INSTITUTIONAL LEGALITY

Throughout the opposition years, Mitsotakis was consistent in using a moderate political discourse which, on the one hand, emphasized the need to reinvigorate Greece’s damaged liberal institutions while, on the other hand, worked toward consensus-building and political compromise. To those ends, and in sharp contrast to the populists’ polarizing motto of “either Them or Us,” Mitsotakis offered a vision of national unity in which the government should not work for “the many [hoi polloi] but for all Greeks [holloi].” Above all, he sought to create an electoral majority consisting largely of entrepreneurial middle-class ordinary people to whom he proposed a sensible policy agenda centered on four issues of general concern: economic growth, public security, state functionality, and halting Greece’s human drain that continued unabated for over a decade.

Continue reading “How to defeat populism – IV”

How to defeat populism – III

This is the third in a mini-series of posts about how to beat populism at the polls. In the first post we emphasized the availability of a liberal leader while the second post we stressed the need of establishing the leader’s authority over a party. This post is about the third requirement for beating populism, namely, a coherent and realistic policy agenda that will serve the interests of the middle classes in society without damaging the liberal institutions. As before, the empirical case study from which we draw theoretical lessons comes from the recent trouncing of Greece’s left populist SYRIZA by the liberal right-of-center party of New Democracy (ND) led by Kyriakos Mitsotakis. Let me however repeat: Greece’s lessons are perfectly portable! So, if you’re interested in the forthcoming presidential elections in the US, please take note.

3/4 THE POLICY AGENDA

Given that populism in power is an illiberal, socially divisive, and politically polarizing project, which also depends heavily on the selective distribution of state-related resources to friends and the penalization of foes, liberalism in opposition should aim at the exact opposite – namely, put forward a political project that would benefit the middle classes, who also constitute the vast majority of the national electorate.

Continue reading “How to defeat populism – III”

How to defeat populism – II

This is the second in a mini-series of posts about how to beat populism at the polls. In the first post we emphasized the availability of a liberal leader who, as we have already seen in a third post, must credibly propose a realistic policy agenda. Unfortunately, not that many such cases from the real world of modern and contemporary politics exist. Perhaps the most significant of them are the defeat of Italy’s Silvio Berlusconi by a coalition of liberal forces in 2013 and the electoral defeat of Argentina’s Cristina Fernández de Kirchner by Mauricio Macri in 2015. Yet, more recently, Greece’s left/right populist government was trounced in repeated elections during 2019 by the liberal right-of-center party of New Democracy (ND) led by Kyriakos Mitsotakis. This series of posts learns from, and is primarily based on, Greece’s recent experience. But such lessons are perfectly portable! So, if you’re interested in the forthcoming presidential elections in the US, please take note.

2/4 LEADER ESTABLISHES AUTHORITY OVER PARTY

By late 2015, having already suffered bitter defeats by the populist forces, opposition center-right ND had to make a hard choice: either compromise with illiberal politics or completely break with it and adopt a fully liberal stance. This was settled unequivocally in January 2016, when the party chose as its new leader Kyriakos Mitsotakis, a 47-year old reformist technocrat and scion of one of Greece’s most significant political families, over Vangelis Meïmarakis, a stalwart supporter of traditional politics.

Continue reading “How to defeat populism – II”

Τι μάς χωρίζει και τι μάς ενώνει τους Έλληνες;

Δημοσιεύτηκε στην Καθημερινή της Κυριακής, 29 Δεκεμβρίου 2019

Θυμόσαστε το περίφημο σλόγκαν «ή εμείς ή αυτοί»; Την αποφθεγματική ρήση «ή τους τελειώνουμε ή μάς τελειώνουν»; Τον διαχωρισμό της κοινωνίας σε «μνημονιακούς» και «αντιμνημονιακούς»; Ασφαλώς και τα θυμόσαστε – είναι άλλωστε τόσο πρόσφατα! Aλλά δεν μοιάζουν όλα αυτά κάπως αλλόκοτα σήμερα, αφού συνεχίζουμε να συμβιώνουμε και να συνεργαζόμαστε, ενώ μάλιστα έχουμε αφήσει τα μνημόνια πίσω μας; Διότι, ξέρετε, στην πραγματικότητα, αυτά που μάς χωρίζουν δεν είναι πολλά. Τουναντίον, έχουμε καταντήσει να «μαλώνουμε για την κοινοτοπία», όπως πολύ ωραία το έθεσε ο Νίκος Βατόπουλος σε ένα πρόσφατο άρθρο του σε αυτήν την εφημερίδα με αφορμή τον χριστουγεννιάτικο διάκοσμο της πρωτεύουσας. Ασφαλώς δε, όσα ακόμη μάς χωρίζουν υπολείπονται σημαντικά από εκείνα που μάς χώρισαν σε παλαιότερες ιστορικές εποχές ή όσα διαιρούν άλλα έθνη σήμερα.

Continue reading “Τι μάς χωρίζει και τι μάς ενώνει τους Έλληνες;”

Populism trivia: When did you first hear about populism defined as “democratic illiberalism” (even before Viktor Orbán made this definition popular)?

Well, definitely NOT in Fareed Zakaria’s “Rise of illiberal democracy.”

Populism first defined as "democratic illiberalism"

The first time that populism was conceptualized and defined simply as “democratic illiberalism” was in this paper, published online in FirstView in July 2013. Interestingly, the subject matter of the paper was a longitudinal comparative analysis of the two countries which, back in the early 2010s, already seemed like exemplars of populism, Greece of its leftist variant, Hungary of a rightist one. [For the record, one of the reviewers rejected the article because (a) the definition was “unconventional” and (b) the comparison of the two countries seemed rather outlandish.]

At the time, I presented the ideas in the paper in a few places and occasions. In one such place, there was an academic and (as I would learn later) close friend of Viktor Orbán who approached me after the presentation for the usual after-event little talk. He was a pleasant old fellow and, as I distinctly remember, he was impressed by my definition of populism. The paper was published in print in early 2014. In the summer of the same year, Orbán would make ripples world-wide with his famous speech about turning Hungary into an “illiberal democratic” state. 

What did Fareed Zakaria have in mind when he wrote about “illiberal democracies,” and why “his” cases aren’t similar to Orbán’s populist democracy?

Published under the title  “Dealing with modern illiberal democracies: From vintage electoral autocracy to today’s jumble of populism with nativism” in Arne Muis and Lars van Troost (eds), Will Human Rights Survive Illiberal Democracy? (Amsterdam: Amnesty International Strategic Studies, 2018), pp. 25-30.

“In the beginning was the Word,” proclaims the Gospel of John, and we should probably take that statement more seriously than we often do. Especially when the talk is about nothing less than the future of contemporary liberal democracy. For, if you really agree with me that liberal democratic politics is currently at risk, and must be rescued, we have first to agree on the nature of the threat to our democracies before we are in a position to propose solutions. As is often the case, then, we must begin by revisiting some of the wisdom received at more politically innocent times.


Continue reading “What did Fareed Zakaria have in mind when he wrote about “illiberal democracies,” and why “his” cases aren’t similar to Orbán’s populist democracy?”

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