Σκίτσο από το κόμικ “I, the People” των Takis Pappas & Alecos Papadatos
Το 2022 είναι φορτωμένο με ενδιαφέρουσες εκλογικές αναμετρήσεις σε πολλές χώρες του κόσμου, ανάμεσά τους τη Γαλλία (όπου κρίνεται η δεύτερη προεδρία Μακρόν), τη Βραζιλία (είναι σχεδόν βέβαιο ότι ο Ζαΐρ Μπολσονάρο θα χάσει την εξουσία), τις Φιλιππίνες (με κύριους πρωταγωνιστές τα παιδιά δύο αυταρχικών ηγετών, το γιό του πρώην δικτάτορα Μάρκος και την κόρη του σημερινού προέδρου Ντουτέρτε), καθώς και τις Ηνωμένες Πολιτείες (όπου στις λεγόμενες «ενδιάμεσες» εκλογές το Δημοκρατικό Κόμμα αναμένεται να υποστεί απώλειες). Καμία από αυτές τις εκλογικές αναμετρήσεις, ωστόσο, δεν θα είναι τόσο σημαντική όσο οι εθνικές εκλογές της Ουγγαρίας στις 3 Απριλίου. Και τούτο διότι κανένα από τα δύο πιθανά αποτελέσματα αυτών των εκλογών δεν πρόκειται να είναι θετικό, ούτε για τη δημοκρατία ούτε για την Ευρώπη.
Το 2022 είναι φορτωμένο με ενδιαφέρουσες εκλογικές αναμετρήσεις σε πολλές χώρες του κόσμου, ανάμεσά τους τη Γαλλία (όπου κρίνεται η δεύτερη προεδρία Μακρόν), τη Βραζιλία (είναι σχεδόν βέβαιο ότι ο Ζαΐρ Μπολσονάρο θα χάσει την εξουσία), τις Φιλιππίνες (με κύριους πρωταγωνιστές τα παιδιά δύο αυταρχικών ηγετών, το γιό του πρώην δικτάτορα Μάρκος και την κόρη του σημερινού προέδρου Ντουτέρτε), καθώς και τις Ηνωμένες Πολιτείες (όπου στις λεγόμενες «ενδιάμεσες» εκλογές το Δημοκρατικό Κόμμα αναμένεται να υποστεί απώλειες). Καμία από αυτές τις εκλογικές αναμετρήσεις, ωστόσο, δεν θα είναι τόσο σημαντική όσο οι εθνικές εκλογές της Ουγγαρίας στις 3 Απριλίου. Και τούτο διότι κανένα από τα δύο πιθανά αποτελέσματα αυτών των εκλογών δεν πρόκειται να είναι θετικό, ούτε για τη δημοκρατία ούτε για την Ευρώπη.
Originally published as an op-ed in Greek newspaper Kathimerini, 30 January 2022.
2022 is packed with critical elections in many places around the globe, including France (to decide whether Emmanuel Macron will continue to be the resident of the Élysée), Brazil (Jair Bolsonaro is almost certain to suffer a rout), the Philippines (featuring the scions of two autocrats—the son of former dictator Ferdinand Marcos and the daughter of current president Rodrigo Duterte—as main protagonists), and the United States (where the Democrats are expected to suffer losses in the November midterm elections). None of those contests, however, is as important as Hungary’s national elections in early April. The reason for that is that none of the possible outcomes in that contest can be good for democracy or for Europe.
Following the expansion of EU over the last seventy years, this infographic depicts the evolution, and relative decline, of Europe’s post-war liberal democratic rule. Back in the 1950s, and for three decades thereafter, all member states had solid liberal democratic governments. The Union was in fact meant to be an exclusive club of liberal democracies. But things did not turn exactly that way. Already by the 1980s, populism, an amalgam of democracy and illiberalism (hence, minimally defined as democratic illiberalism), won power in Greece and then flourished elsewhere, particularly in the southern and eastern parts of the continent. During and after the 1990s, nativist parties—those standing in opposition to migration, further European integration, and globalization—grew strong in most developed countries in western and northern Europe. Meanwhile in Eastern Europe—because of national and ethnic divisions, persisting state corruption, or both—most countries have failed to this date to produce solid and durable liberal democratic governments; instead, as shown by the four CEE countries included herein, most governments in this region stand today as exemplars of democratic illiberalism.
An Q&A session with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) about populism, and more. We discuss about the spatiotemporal dimensions of this phenomenon; the relationship of modern populism to liberal democracy, of which it is the polar opposite; the difference between populist and nativist parties; the importance of charismatic leadership for the populist success; and the ways in which contemporary liberal democracy may face the populist menace. Most of those topics have been covered in previous work of mine, especially in my book Populism and Liberal Democracy: A Comparative and Theoretical Analysis. Hope you will enjoy the interview. For more interviews of mine related to populism, you may want to read or listen here, here, and here.
Q Your research underlines the necessity of the clarification of the basic concepts and exposes the conceptual and methodological errors in populism literature. To begin with, how do you outline the common problems within the growing literature on populism?
A The literature on populism has grown fast but also in a haphazard way. As a result, the concept of populism is being stretched to a breaking point. It was several decades ago that Margaret Canovan, among others, warned that, the more flexible this concept would become, the more tempted political scientists and others would be to label “populist” anything that doesn’t fit into previously established categories. This is what has actually happened. Today, “populism” is everywhere and almost everything is “populist.”
The questions in this interview were asked by Professor Marlene Laruelle, director of the Illiberal Studies Program, Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University. We talk about how to conceptualize populism in a minimal way; the differences between mine and Fareed Zakaria’s notions of “democratic illiberalism,” the distinctions among populist, nativist, and nationalist parties; the similarities between European and American populisms; charismatic leadership and Poland’s leader Jarosław Kaczyński; Greece’s politics, of course; left and right populisms, and why they tend to form alliances; and the basic building blocs of a taxonomy of political regimes worldwide. I hope you will enjoy it! For more interviews of mine on topics related to populism, you can also check here, here, and here.
In your book Populism and Liberal Democracy: A Comparative and Theoretical Analysis(Oxford, 2019), you speak of democratic illiberalism, thereby reversing the terms used in Zakaria’s famous text on illiberal democracies. Can you explain to our readers how you define democratic illiberalism?
In my work, populism is conceptualized and defined minimally as “democratic illiberalism,” which points to modern political systems, political parties, or individual politicians combining adherence to electoral democracy and liberal democratic principles. I also use the term “populist democracy” with reference to political systems in which both the ruling party and major opposition forces are populist. I first used these terms in an article that compared Greece and Hungary as typical populist democracies and was published in 2013 in Government and Opposition. (Notice, by the way, that this Hungary-specific article preceded by at least a year Orbán’s now-famous 2014 speech in Transylvania, after which this term became common.) Anyway, my definition of populism recalls Fareed Zakaria’s terminology but the puzzles that motivate my research, the empirical cases I focus on, and the theoretical propositions I put forward are entirely different than his. The contrast is very interesting from a sociology-of-knowledge point of view, so let me say a bit more about it.
Why do we need another book about populism? Given the mountain of commentary on the topic since the “populist explosion” of 2016, this is a reasonable question to ask. Takis Pappas agrees and captures the problem well when he argues that our problem with the concept of populism is “ontological.” We do not have a clear view of what it is that we are describing or talking about; thus we need to start from first principles to provide a satisfactory answer to the question.
Thus begins a thoughtful and engaging discussion. Pappas takes up the methodological challenge of trying to find an ontological basis for the concept of populism with great vigor, with erudition and insight gleaned not only from deep familiarization with the key texts on populism but also from a panoptic comparative approach that takes in data in an impressive global sweep.
The universe of political parties is one of immense complexity. To make it comprehensible, one has to divide its countless units into a relatively small number of specific party types and subtypes that are well distinguished from each other. This requires that each type is defined minimally, that is to say, in a way that includes only its core characteristics, or properties. Ideally, at any given moment no two party types should fit under the same definition. And each definition should point to specific, real-life political parties that are out there in the world. Here is, then, my original attempt to produce a typology of the macrocosm of political parties that is useful for political scientists and practitioners of politics alike. Meanwhile, spotting the populists is now being made easy. Cat-dogs no more.
Circa 1990, nearly all major parties in Europe belonged to the liberal type. Fast forward through the decades that followed since to our own day, and this isn’t the case any more. Liberal parties are currently in decline while other party types, such as populist and nativist parties, have emerged strong in several nations across the continent. How did that happen and what are the main consequences of such transformations? This essay and the interactive infographic that accompanies it explain.
The content of this blog has appeared in the form of policy brief published by the European Liberal Forum in May 2021.
stating THE ISSue
For a time, post-war European politics was dominated by the liberal type of party. These broadly liberal parties were who originally envisaged the idea of a united Europe and subsequently carried the torch for the advancement of open society in a progressively integrated Europe under rule of law. Over many decades, Europe’s party systems operated as liberal political cartels in which the major parties competed for power against each other, largely unchallenged by other party types. Fast forward to the present day, and the talk around town is about the decline of the formerly established liberal parties, the proliferation of new populist ones, and, ominously enough, the rise of various other so-called anti-system parties—leading to democratic backsliding and, potentially, the disintegration of the European Union. Which part of this narrative corresponds to empirical reality, and which is just hype and headlines? More to the point: What is the current picture of Europe’s party politics? And what is the outlook for the future at EU level?
This infographic presents an original typology of political parties in contemporary Europe during the last three decades. It differentiates between seven clearly defined types of parties that are exclusive to each other while collectively including all currently significant parties. The seven party types are: Liberal, populist, nativist, nationalist, regionalist, secessionist, and antidemocratic. The infographic is interactive. If downloaded, you may click on the party acronyms and visit their respective official web pages for more information. Enjoy your exploration to Europe’s ever-changing party and party system landscapes; get your concepts and definitions right; learn how to differentiate populist from non-populist parties (in a per genus et differentiam way); puzzle out how governments are formed; and get a hands-on understanding of your own about the dynamics currently developing, as well as the directions European liberal politics is likely to take in the future.
To download the full infographic, interact with it, and even print it in high-quality and professional form, click on the button below.
