The invention of “populism”

Making retrospective sense of what really happened in 2016, the year “populism” was invented, and addressing the stubborn misconceptions the populist hype has given rise to. There are lessons to be learned.

As 2016 was drawing to a close, a Washington Post journalist put it all in this nutshell: “If you had to sum up 2016 in one word, you might choose ‘populism’.” For The Economist, too, 2016 was “a year of triumph for populists in many places.” As this newspaper warned, in both America and Europe right-wing populists were on the march playing on widespread social resentment (picture below on left). Others were already busy in writing epitaphs for liberal democracy. Never mind that Grexit, perhaps the most sensational story of 2015 (it merited four Economist covers in that year alone), had been prompted by Greece’s leftist populist government. Never mind, too, the Economist’s own confusion with terminology since, by the end of 2016, it was using “nationalism” as synonymous to populism (picture below on right). Be that as it may, by then “populism” had become commonplace. It was now the catchword that could explain all the ills that afflict modern democracy. The logic is simple and goes as follows: Populism is bad for democracy; hence, when you think a democracy goes badly, look for populists. Or just invent them!

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Populism vs. nativism

Populism and nativism are often confused. But they are distinct phenomena. They develop in different places, have different causes, use different rhetoric and symbolic discourse, present different leaderships, and have different kinds of influence on the democratic societies in which they develop. Therefore, they call for different political and policy responses from politicians, policy-makers, and other relevant stakeholders in society. This infographic points out those differences. If you want to know more, please check my previous work on this topic herehere, and here. More is to come.

Populism vs. nativism: 10 indicators to tell the two apart

These two terms (or, better, concepts) are often confused. They are often lumped together under the generic, and generally abused, “populism” label. But nativism and populism are quite distinct phenomena. They have different causes, different ways of developing in contemporary Europe, and different kinds of influence on the democratic societies in which they grow. Clearly, then, they call for different political and policy responses from politicians, policy-makers, and other relevant stakeholders in society. This post is a simple endeavor to point out those differences. If you want to read more about them, please check my previous work on this topic here, here, and here. I am currently continuing my work on nativism within the H2020 PaCE research program. And, in a not so remote future as I hope, there will be more to say and write in book form about Europe’s strongly nativist nations.

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The swift extinction of Europe’s ruling nativist parties.

Whether because of the conceptual confusion between populist and nativist parties, (which are often but erroneously lumped together in the ill-defined categories of “far right” or “nationalist populist,”) or whether because of the spectacular lack of knowledge about the country cases out there, most people, including serious journalists, policy makers, and politicians, fail to make sense of the — no so subtle — distinctions among contemporary democracy’s main challengers. Take, for instance, the nativist parties.

First the news: Earlier today, Norway’s Progress Party (party logo pictured above), a long-term junior coalition partner in Norway’s broadly conservative government, quit office. This is small global news, perhaps, but reveals something really big, at least for Europe. For, as of now, January 2020, no nativist party enjoys governmental power in any European country (bar Switzerland). Second, the irritant: Who are now going to cry wolf when no wolf does really exist? Now, the facts:

Fact #1: Before 2000, there were no nativist parties in Europe to have enjoyed governmental responsibilities. Continue reading “The swift extinction of Europe’s ruling nativist parties.”

Bad concepts

This is the third in a series of posts about concepts and the (good and bad) ways in which we use them to conceptualize real-world politics. The first post was about concepts in general and how they work. The second post was about “good” concepts while this third post is about “bad” concepts.

WHEN A CONCEPT IS BAD?

Unlike good concepts, which feature a simple term, unambiguous meaning, and clearly identifiable referents, a concept is said to be bad when (1) it is based on a confusing term, (2) its meaning-to-word is ambiguous, which results in definitional disasters, and (3) its meaning-to-referents is vague, which makes operationalization, and eventually the classification of the units to be analyzed, impossible. Bad concepts lead to a bad understanding of the world.

Several good examples of bad concepts are in Cas Mudde’s new book The Far Right Today (a research area that is close to my own research interests and about which I claim some knowledge myself). The book is full of terms meant to signify a host of “ideologies,” which merge and combine with each other only to produce more confusion. The main definitions (as presented at the book’s end in glossary form) are below. This terminological maze is the result of two major errors: |A| poor conceptualization, which creates definitional disasters, and |B| false synonymies, which derail concept operationalization and frustrate the classification of empirical cases. Let me clarify. Continue reading “Bad concepts”

What did Fareed Zakaria have in mind when he wrote about “illiberal democracies,” and why “his” cases aren’t similar to Orbán’s populist democracy?

Published under the title  “Dealing with modern illiberal democracies: From vintage electoral autocracy to today’s jumble of populism with nativism” in Arne Muis and Lars van Troost (eds), Will Human Rights Survive Illiberal Democracy? (Amsterdam: Amnesty International Strategic Studies, 2018), pp. 25-30.

“In the beginning was the Word,” proclaims the Gospel of John, and we should probably take that statement more seriously than we often do. Especially when the talk is about nothing less than the future of contemporary liberal democracy. For, if you really agree with me that liberal democratic politics is currently at risk, and must be rescued, we have first to agree on the nature of the threat to our democracies before we are in a position to propose solutions. As is often the case, then, we must begin by revisiting some of the wisdom received at more politically innocent times.


Continue reading “What did Fareed Zakaria have in mind when he wrote about “illiberal democracies,” and why “his” cases aren’t similar to Orbán’s populist democracy?”

What makes populists and nativists distinct?

Originally published in Democratic Audit, LSE/UK, March 2018

The recent surge of various challenges to democracy in Europe has presented scholars, policy makers, journalists and other pundits with an empirical muddle. As we now try to make sense of Europe’s fast-changing political landscape, we are faced with the following predicament: still lacking well-defined concepts and, therefore, unable to classify our empirical cases into mutually exclusive, jointly exhaustive, and empirically useful categories, the tendency is to lump together disparate challengers to contemporary democracy under the ill-defined ‘populism’ label. Yet, at the end, the result is data misgathering and the comparison of nonequivalent units under the erroneous assumption that they are equivalent. This amounts to wasteful research. It also eludes sensible responses to the various challengers.

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The Specter Haunting Europe: Distinguishing Liberal Democracy’s Challengers

Published in Journal of Democracy 27(4), October 2016 https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Pappas-27-4.pdf

The recent surge of various challenges to democracy in Europe has presented scholars and policy makers with an empirical muddle. European democracy seems to be in jeopardy, and there is no shortage of culprits. In parts of the continent, far-left parties are wielding new influence; in other places, the far right has risen. Nativists thrive on growing xenophobia, and even racist and neo-Nazi forces are lurking.

Amid the worry, it is crucial to be clear about two things. First, not all of democracy’s challengers are the same, despite a promiscuous tendency to label them all as “populists.” Second, their rise is not traceable to a single cause, and hence should not be expected to prompt a single response. Parties and movements that do not belong to the same species should not to be treated as if they do—it will only make the search for causes and solutions harder.[1] We are dealing with a range of political phenomena that have their own distinct sets of causes, normative assumptions, and practical consequences. Continue reading “The Specter Haunting Europe: Distinguishing Liberal Democracy’s Challengers”

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